

See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/333207643>

# Initiatives and Perceptions to Counter Violent Extremism in the Coastal Region of Kenya

Article · January 2018

---

CITATIONS

6

READS

557

2 authors, including:



**Fathima Azmiya Badurdeen**

Technical University of Mombasa

13 PUBLICATIONS 16 CITATIONS

SEE PROFILE

Some of the authors of this publication are also working on these related projects:



Governing Youth Politics in the Age of Surveillance, [View project](#)

## Initiatives and Perceptions to Counter Violent Extremism in the Coastal Region of Kenya

Fathima Azmiya Badurdeen<sup>a1</sup>, Dr. Paul Goldsmith<sup>b</sup>

<sup>a</sup>PhD Candidate, Department of Social Sciences, Technical University of Mombasa.

<sup>b</sup>Independent Consultant in Peace and Security Studies

### **Abstract**

The Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) discourse in Kenya reflects the larger Global War on Terror (GWOT) policy framework. Donor-driven governmental approaches support the top-down efforts to counter violent extremism. CVE initiatives now emerging in response to the rise of homegrown violent extremism in Kenya, in contrast, seek to encourage more community participation in the campaign to limit the activities of Al-Shabaab. This article examines existing countering violent extremism (CVE) initiatives in order to elucidate the effectiveness and shortcomings of CVE interventions. The findings are based on an ethnographic study in the coastal region of Kenya comprising of 249 in-depth interviews with key informants, observations and eight focus group discussions. The article maps existing CVE projects across Kenya's coast including the prevention framework of primary, secondary and tertiary interventions as modelled on preventative public health approaches. Assessment of existing CVE programs provides information elucidating what works and for whom from a community perspective. Feedback from the community is critical for, facilitating effective measures for mitigating the process of youth radicalization in the coast region. The findings reported here recommend periodic consultation with the intended beneficiaries and other CVE initiatives' stakeholders to enhance the sustainability of the projects.

### **Article History**

Received March 6, 2018

Accepted May 31, 2018

Published Sept 28, 2018

**Keywords:** Countering Violent Extremism, Al-Shabaab, Coastal Region of Kenya, Evidence-Based Interventions, Youth Radicalization

### **Introduction**

“Young people become radicalized due to different needs and motivations. If interventions are to be effective, these different needs and motivations should be addressed. There is no one fixed intervention for all. Responses from all different

---

<sup>1</sup> Corresponding Author Contact: Fathima Azmiya Badurdeen, Email: [fazmiya@tum.ac.ke](mailto:fazmiya@tum.ac.ke); Department of Social Sciences, Technical University of Mombasa, P.O. Box 90420 -80100, Mombasa, Kenya.

---

stakeholders are needed for mitigating youth radicalization and recruitment for the Al-Shabaab”<sup>2</sup>

Youth radicalization and recruitment by the Al-Shabaab Islamist insurgency<sup>3</sup> has become a core security concern in Kenya since the Kenyan Defense Forces (KDF) military intervention into Somalia in October 2011. The intention was to create a buffer to prevent Al-Shabaab extremism spilling into Kenya, but the occupation of the Jubaland region instead exacerbated problems of homegrown radicalization and recruitment (International Crisis Group, 2014). Al-Shabaab recruiters succeed by tapping into long-standing grievances associated with the poverty and neglect of the peripheral coastal and north-eastern regions during the post-independence era (Badurdeen, 2012; International Crisis Group, 2014). The magnitude of the youth radicalization and recruitment problem prompted the state’s security agencies and development partners to formulate and execute counter terrorism, radicalization and de-radicalization policies (Prevention of Terrorism Act – 2012; Security Laws (Amendment) Act – 2014; and, the National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism, in 2016) based on the globally framed countering violent extremism (CVE) discourse (Global Counter Terrorism Strategy – 2006)

Countering radicalization and recruitment requires a spectrum of multi-faceted initiatives including apprehending extremist leaders and radical entrepreneurs, increasing development investments in marginalized areas of the coast and the north eastern regions, rehabilitation of radicalized former combatants, and promoting values of inclusivity to mitigate the spread of extremist ideology. This entails interventions addressing the three prevention levels of the public health model (primary, secondary and tertiary). Primary prevention is a broad approach aimed at the whole society. Interventions at this level aim at mitigating the root causes of extremist behavior by addressing social grievances that drive populations to violent

---

<sup>2</sup> Interview, NGO Personnel, March 02, 2016.

<sup>3</sup> Al-Shabaab known as the ‘Youth’ is a Jihadist fundamentalist group in East Africa originating from Somalia. The insurgency movement originated as a hard-lined youth militant group under the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) in Somalia. The movement aimed to wage Jihad against the enemies of Islam and engaged in combat against the Federal Government of Somalia and the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM). The movement has attracted youth from Kenya and other countries from East Africa.

---

extremism. Secondary prevention aims at individual and groups identified as at risk<sup>4</sup> for violent extremism. Interventions at this level target the prevention of radicalization progression and reducing attempt for future radicalization. Tertiary prevention focuses on radicalized individuals or groups actively planning, recruiting for violent extremist cause (Challgren, et al. 2016).

As in many parts of the world, in Kenya the umbrella term Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) refers to efforts to prevent and counter the process of radicalization leading to terrorism. This article uses the term CVE to explain interventions aimed at mitigating violent extremism with regard to Al-Shabaab's activities in Kenya. In this article, CVE refers to current policies and practices for preventing and countering radicalization and recruitment into violent extremism and terrorism. Over the longer run, CVE is a core component of a nation's larger counter terrorism framework and strategy. The definition includes interventions ranging from community awareness, civic education, countering extremist narratives, community engagement, community policing, counter recruitment strategies, disengagement and demobilization, and rehabilitation for individuals who had engaged in violent extremism.

This article examines ongoing CVE initiatives in the coastal region of Kenya based on narratives and observations concerning their effectiveness and gaps. The study focuses on how respondents involved in coastal CVE initiatives felt about the programs' impact on the ground. This was important to understand the effectiveness of CVE programmes in the coastal region and to understand the impact of the programmes at different levels of interventions: primary, secondary and tertiary. The article is divided into three parts. The first section describes the evolving CVE discourse and interventions in Kenya. The second section maps the CVE interventions at primary, secondary and tertiary levels as defined by the public health model. The final section provides the conclusion highlighting the pathway for enhancing CVE interventions in coastal Kenya.

---

<sup>4</sup> This includes individuals or groups at risk for Al-Shabaab radicalization or recruitment, such as individuals prone to violent gangs or crimes, drug abuse, live in particular hotspots for radicalization or have friends or family members associated to the Al-Shabaab.

## Methods and sources

This article is an outcome on the first author's PhD field research of 18 months (December 2015 to June 2017), comprising of 249 interviews with key informants such as religious, community leaders, government officials, youth labelled as or accused of being Al-Shabaab radicals, and their family members as shown in the table below. The study explored the push and pull factors for youth radicalization in the coastal region of Kenya, for the terrorist network Al-Shabaab. Social movement theory (SMT) shaped the theoretical framework for the study to understand the radicalization and recruitment process of youth into the Al-Shabaab movement from the coastal region. Most of the interviews lasted from 45 minutes to one hour. Interviews with family members of terror suspects ranged between one to two hours due to the need for time in building trust with the participants. Field interviews were recorded on notebooks and later transcribed. Twelve observations of the trials of terror suspects in courts, and eight focus group discussions also informed the study. Consent had been obtained from the authorities for the observations. The study was carried out in four counties identified as hotspots in the coastal region of Kenya: Mombasa, Kwale, Kilifi and Lamu.

Ethical issues were addressed at each phase of the study. In compliance with the Procedures and Guidelines for Research Authorization in Kenya regulations, permission for conducting the research was obtained prior to the conducting of the research such as the review by the ethical clearance committee by the Pwani University of Kenya and the research permit from the National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation (NACOSTI) that approved the research. The research was carefully planned aimed to adhere fully to ethical standards and maintain safety to all concerned.

Respondents were initially informed on the nature and motivations of the study so that they were able to decide on whether to participate in the study or not. A form was shared with the respondents that informed them of their guaranteed rights, and that the researcher involved in the study acknowledged the protection of their rights. The anonymity of respondents was protected by assigning fictitious names and numbers in their statements and in the reporting of

the results. This was to safeguard their security and to avoid any harm that could potentially affect them. The risks to the respondent were considered in terms of physical and psychological harm, risks to the individual's personal standing within the communities they are a part of, privacy, personal values and beliefs, and threat to their families and their occupation. Careless references to offensive religious stereotyping, assumptions and other statements that may hurt the respondent were avoided. Due caution was taken in reference to emotional events that may arise during the course of the study. The researcher ensured the confidentiality of participants, and the anonymity of respondents and locations where meeting were held.

Table 1 – Key Informant Details

	Mombasa	Kwale	Kilifi	Lamu	Total
Youth labeled radicals	16	3	2		21
Convicted youth radicals/returnees	3	3	2	1	9
Family members of radicals	9	2	5		16
Religious leaders	4	4	4	4	16
School Teachers/Madrasa Teachers	4	4	2	2	12
Law enforcement personnel	7	4	2	2	15
Village elder/Community leaders	4	4	1	1	10
NGO/INGO personnel involved or connected to de-radicalization organizations	16	4	3	4	27
Youth leaders	12	8	16	6	42
Women leaders	3	3	3	3	12
Academics	6		2		8
Other community members/youth	32	14	8	7	61
Total					249

### The evolving CVE discourse and interventions in Kenya

CVE has its origins in the early European Exit programs in Norway, Germany and Sweden of the 1980s that focused on right wing violent extremism (Demant, et al. 2008). The Organization

---

for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OCSE) was among the first international bodies that recognized the need to address root causes of terrorism in contrast to the US response to the 9/11 aftermath that focused mainly on conventional counterterrorism (OCSE, 2014). One of the first national level CVE programs was started in the United Kingdom in 2006 to counter homegrown violent extremism with emphasis on Islamic extremism (HM Government, 2006). In 2015, the White House summit drew international attention to the need for CVE to focus on building awareness of CVE, counter extremist narratives, and to emphasize community-led efforts (Chertoff, 2015).

Kenya's CVE initiatives emerged in response to the homegrown violent extremism supported by Al-Shabaab, although it was rooted in the historical landscapes of violent extremism across the Middle East, North Africa, the western Sahel, and the Horn of Africa (Davis 2010; Ridley 2014). The first Islamist terrorist attacks in Kenya were not directed at the Kenyan population or state, but targeted American and Israeli interests in the country. The suspect associated with the bomb that destroyed a wing of Nairobi's Norfolk Hotel in 1980, Qaddura Mohamed Abdel al-Hamid, was a Moroccan supporter of the Palestinian cause motivated by Kenya's logistical support for Israel during their raid on Entebbe in 1976. The bombing of the American Embassy in Kenya and Tanzania by Al-Qaeda affiliates in 1998 signaled a new phase in the conflict (Vadlamudi 2007). Kenya's position on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict featured in the bombing of the Israeli owned Paradise Hotel in Mombasa and failed attempt to shoot down an Israel charter plane in 2001 (Dunstan 2011; Beyer 2008). Early attacks in Kenya by Al-Shabaab's Islamist terror network were a response to Kenya's role as a proxy for American interventions in Somalia. Al-Shabaab attacks in Kenya intensified after Kenyan Defense Forces entered Somalia to create a cross border buffer zone in October 2011 (Hansen, 2013). Kenya subsequently suffered from repeated Al-Shabaab terrorist attacks, including the 2013 attack on the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, a series of raids in Lamu in 2014, and the Garissa University attack in 2015 (Cannon and Pakalya, 2017).

In contemporary Kenya, youth radicalization into the Al-Shabaab poses as a security threat. Radicalization of young people raised considerable alarm when a broad range of ethnic

---

groups of Kenyan nationals were involved along with Somali nationals. These Kenyan youth mainly came from the North Eastern, Coast regions and urban informal settlements such as Majengo (informal settlement in Nairobi's Eastlands). The context of youth being radicalized raised concerns when the UN Monitoring Group for Somalia and Eriteria reported that hundreds of impoverished Kenyan youths were recruited into Al-Shabaab (UN Report, 2012). The Al-Shabaab did not recruit only fighters from Kenya but also trained them as suicide bombers (Botha, 2013). For example, on 19 April 2007 a suicide bomber detonated his device as he crashed onto the gates of an Ethiopian army base in Mogadishu. The suicide bomber was identified as a Kenyan national Othman Otayo. Irrespective of exactly how many Kenyans have membership at Al-Shabaab, the cases identified are sufficient to justify closer scrutiny of the circumstances that increase the vulnerability of Kenyan youths to radicalization and recruitment to organizations such as Al-Shabaab (Botha, 2013). Among them youth from impoverished regions (the Coast region) were very vulnerable as those who recruited new members used local vulnerabilities and contextual circumstances to their advantage. Kenya with its bulging youth population and the contextual factors provide a ripe situation for youth radicalization. Some of the driving factors for youth radicalization were as follows: discrimination, grievances, poverty, lack of opportunities in employment and education (Badurdeen, 2012).

American and Israeli influence has been a primary influence on the Kenyan counterterrorism (CT) discourse. Apart from aid related incentives, the passing of anti-terrorism legislation and the formation of regional alliances under the US-East Africa Counterterrorism Initiative reinforced Kenya's role as a close ally of the US led War on Terror (Prestholdt 2011; Mogire and Agade 2011; Ramraj et al. 2012). It is important to note that the US led Global War on Terror (GWOT) manifests in diverse ways in different localities due to its intersection with domestic and regional politics (Howell & Lind, 2009).

Peace building efforts addressing ethnic and religious radicalization in the coastal region began with the Peace, Security and Development Program implemented by the Danish International Development Agency in 2005, which brought together five civil society organization to counter radicalization in the coastal region. Since then, the CT discourse has



---

emphasized CVE approaches based on strengthening community efforts to prevent and mitigate violent extremism. CVE programmes in the coast were further strengthened by the Kenya Transition Initiative (KTI), a USAID supported CVE initiative that focused on selected communities in Nairobi and on the coast (Mombasa, Lamu etc.) with the objective of mitigating key push and pull factors for violent radicalization (DANIDA, 2015). The National Counter-Terrorism strategy launched in 2015 marked the commitment of the government to incorporate soft approaches aimed at prevention complementing the state's hard security measures for countering terrorism (Ruteere and Mutahi, 2018).

The National CVE strategy (NCVE), officially launched in September 2016 expanded the focus, of the fight against terrorism by incorporating collaborative CVE approaches bringing together the government, communities, civil society, the international community, and the private sector.<sup>5</sup> Subsequently, CVE plans have been decentralized through the design of county-level CVE action plans in Kwale, Kilifi, Lamu, Mombasa, and several counties in northern Kenya (Ogada, 2017). Partnerships with county governments and local community actors, particularly in those counties most affected, are required to increase the local legitimacy of CVE interventions<sup>6</sup> taking into account the local framing and historization of the context of violent extremism and the genealogy of evolving violent extremist ideologies. Since 2016 Strengthening Community Resilience against Extremism (SCORE) funding has provided grants and training to civil society organizations (CSOs) in six counties on the Coast. The county government plan of Kwale is commendable in this regard as it is among the first initiatives of CVE action plans designed at the county level. County level strategies focused on county specific push and pull factors on VE and sought to address VE using county specific interventions. The success of the Kwale county plan has facilitated the development of similar county action plans in Kilifi, Mombasa and Lamu.

---

<sup>5</sup> There is a need for awareness on the national CVE strategy (NCVE) among the CSOs and the community members. At present, the National CVE strategy (NCVE) is undergoing its first review of the strategy. Identified gaps by the community such as the Economic and Gender pillar are to be incorporated in to this strategy reflecting the needs of the community.

<sup>6</sup> Interview, community mobilizer, February 12, 2017.

---

## Interventions at the primary level

Primary prevention based on the public health model emphasizes on a broad approach directed towards the whole society. The focus of interventions is to mitigate the root causes of extremist behavior by addressing social grievances of populations sympathetic to violent extremism. Interventions at this level include addressing deep-rooted grievances stemming from the lack of educational and job opportunities while supporting social engagement, cultural awareness, and youth development programs.

The dearth of socio-economic opportunities, discrimination resulting from marginalization, poor governance abetting the deteriorating state-citizen relationship, violation of human rights, and selective application of the rule of law contribute to coastal communities' collective grievances. The same factors act as push factors for recruits embracing violent extremism (Badurdeen, 2012; Botha, 2013; International Crisis Group, 2012). Al-Shabaab recruiters exploit these collective grievances in their radicalization and recruitment strategies by crafting ideologically driven narratives focusing on a common enemy in the form of the Kenyan state' and its Western government partners',<sup>7</sup> while highlighting the plight of communities and individual victims (Badurdeen, 2016). Recruiters follow up by responding to their needs in terms of materialistic and/or spiritual support.<sup>8</sup>

Addressing the collective grievances of the coastal population is now central to primary interventions on CVE. A main reason being that if collective grievances of marginalization and poor governance is addressed it has the ability to reduce the appeal for violent extremist networks such as the Al-Shabaab, that thrives on narratives pegged to collective grievances.<sup>9</sup> Investment in development projects, inclusive of mega development or infrastructural projects is a viable option for job creation, among other economic opportunities, which can deter young people from being driven into radical groups (Kessels and Nemr, 2016; USAID, 2011). Al-

---

<sup>7</sup> United States and her European allies in the GWOT are referred to as the West.

<sup>8</sup> Interview, women leader, March 22, 2016.

<sup>9</sup> Interview, women leader, August 12, 2016.

---

Shabaab followers and sympathizers motivated primarily by economic hardship could be deterred by increased developmental inputs for poverty ridden localities.<sup>10</sup> Most youth at risk of radicalization or recruitment come from economically deprived pockets of the coastal region where they face limited viable options for employment.<sup>11</sup> The government and civil society actors should focus on providing more resources to address the root causes associated with socio-economic drivers of violent radicalization. An interviewee explained that increased investment in public education, poverty reduction, and unemployment is pivotal to counter Al-Shabaab radicalization in the coast<sup>12</sup>. Such initiatives will help youth find purpose within their communities, preventing them from seeking new identities through a radical Al-Shabaab ideology.<sup>13</sup>

Investment in large projects such as public infrastructure projects at the coastal region have the potential to generate jobs for youth who are at risk of joining extremist causes.<sup>14</sup> This will not happen without specific mechanisms designed to benefit the local youth in the communities. For example, mega projects such as the LAPPSET (Lamu Port and Southern Sudan-Ethiopia Transport Corridor) generate opposition due to the lack of participation by the local communities and the perception that most of the jobs created will benefit outsiders (Badurdeen and Ndenyele, 2014).<sup>15</sup> Other factors included ethnic favoritism and the youth's lack of skills matching the labor required by projects. This is why these projects tend to be viewed as government-led initiatives more likely to benefit outsiders than the local population.<sup>16</sup>

Educational and vocational training, career guidance programs, credit schemes and networking opportunities can be harnessed to improve local youth's employment prospects.<sup>17</sup>

---

<sup>10</sup> Interview, Community Mobilizer, May 05, 2016.

<sup>11</sup> Interview, Community Mobilizer, June 12, 2016.

<sup>12</sup> Interview, Youth Leader, September 09, 2016.

<sup>13</sup> Interview, Community Leader, January 02, 2017.

<sup>14</sup> Interview, Religious Leader, March 15, 2016.

<sup>15</sup> Outsiders here refer to people who are from outside regions of the country, and do not reside or have coast as their origins.

<sup>16</sup> Interview, Youth Leader, May 09, 2017.

<sup>17</sup> Field Notes, August 09, 2016.

---

The livelihood potential of the coastal region need to be harnessed through policies targeting the modernization of fishing industry, revival of the coconut and the cashew nut industries, training for the hospitality trade, and support for the other informal sector businesses that currently employ a significant number of coastal youths.<sup>18</sup>

Another factor that is often cited as problematic is the issue of land ownership in the coastal region of Kenya.<sup>19</sup> Land grievances reflecting the marginalization of the coastal region are a product of policies embraced by the succession of post-independence government policies. The issue of land has played a core role in social movements in the coast, such as the Mombasa Republican Council and extremist groups like Kaya Bombo in Kwale, and was cited in the Al Shabaab statement justifying the raids on upcountry settlers in Lamu. Implementing the land reforms mandated by the new constitution and the issuance of title deeds demand immediate attention to address such long standing issues.<sup>20</sup>

Poor governance and corruption is responsible for the lack of trust in the government, generating disillusionment in many coastal communities. Devolution under the 2010 Constitution was to provide answers to the existing governance deficit (Nyanjom, 2011; Bosire, 2013). The system of county governments has, however, fostered elite communities where employment opportunities are still based on patronage and development rarely trickles down to the marginalized households.<sup>21</sup> Al-Shabaab recruiters prey on disillusioned members of communities such as youth who are frustrated by the Kenya's political elite's culture of impunity. Civil society actors should therefore play an active role with other stakeholders such as traditional elders and religious leaders to improve monitoring of new developments contributing to the region's marginalization.<sup>22</sup>

---

<sup>18</sup> Interview, Community Mobilizer, January 02, 2017.

<sup>19</sup> Most community members live as tenants in their own lands due to the lack of title deeds. Issuance of title deeds to coastal people has been controversial due to multiple ownerships and lack of documentation.

<sup>20</sup> Interview, women leader, May 07, 2016.

<sup>21</sup> Interview, Religious Leader, May 21, 2016.

<sup>22</sup> Interview, Academic, March 03, 2016.

---

One interviewee highlighted the need for trust building efforts between law enforcement and communities. Community-based law enforcement programs can improve the relationships and generate trust between police forces and communities.<sup>23</sup> STRIVE II (Strengthening Resilience to Violent Extremism) has focused on promoting interaction between law enforcement and civil society by building the capacity of security sector and law enforcement authorities and civil society to collaborate in preventing violent extremism (RUSI, 2017). The effectiveness of the Independent Policing Oversight Authority is crucial in investigating all forms of police misconduct including deaths in custody and serious injuries as a result of police action as it has the authority to investigate complaints against the police, monitor police operations and to look into particular incidents if delayed. These initiatives facilitate awareness raising for law enforcement agencies personnel about violent extremism drivers and CVE responses (CHRIPS, 2014). The role that civil society can play, as well as their attitude and behaviour towards the police, can foster building a more collaborative and inclusive partnership leading to positive citizen-law enforcement relations that help undermine the narratives of extremist groups and reduce recruitment (Brett and Kahlmeyer, 2017).

Despite the success of security sector hard responses in temporarily quelling violent extremism, the indiscriminate execution of these actions exerts unintended impacts due to the radicalizing impact on innocent individuals and at-risk youth.<sup>24</sup> They can also radicalize sympathetic groups or produce new offshoots of extremist groups.<sup>25</sup> Kenya's security sector must reassess its counterterrorism strategy's consequences for marginalized groups, particularly Somali Muslims and coastal Muslims (Badurdeen, 2017). This is vital for community policing efforts that require continuous engagement with local communities. Community trust depends on the credibility of the security sector in respect to thorough and timely investigations into allegations of arbitrary detention, raids, arrests, extrajudicial killings and use of torture by the security forces (Ayiera, 2015). States become part of the problem in

---

<sup>23</sup> Field Notes, May 07, 2016.

<sup>24</sup> Interview, CBO Personnel, April 14, 2017.

<sup>25</sup> Interview, women leader, June 11, 2016.

---

nurturing violent extremism when institutions fail to implement laws, lack the capacity to effectively prosecute crimes related to violent extremism, or when they go beyond the existing laws or resort to non-conventional ways for dealing with violent extremism (Sodipo, 2013). These problems feed the collective grievances narrative of indigenous coastal communities and provide the justification, extremists exploit through narratives focusing on the unfair treatment by the government and law enforcement officers.<sup>26</sup> Such problematic state responses towards extremism are based on the tendency to over-react, resulting in vulnerable populations feeling they are the target of politically motivated and religiously biased security practices and unjust judicial systems (UNDP, 2016:19).

Swift government responses in the aftermath of the Westgate terrorist attack in Kenya prompted changes in the counter terrorism (CT) discourse. First, the government strengthened the 2012 Prevention of Terrorism Act and passed amendments to the Security (Amendment) Act of 2014. Responses to civil society included freezing accounts of NGOs and CBOs, accusing NGOs/CBOs of funding or aiding terrorism, and blaming NGOs and some donors for disrupting government-led counterterrorism initiatives. The changes resulted in more scrutiny of organizations and their interventions that acted to narrow the political space for dissent and advocacy criticizing government CT measures (Kenya Human Rights Commission Report, 2016). This has wider implications for the overall CVE approach as NGOs respond by harmonizing CVE projects and NGO policies with government-led CT strategies and by reducing criticism of government CT strategies by NGOs. This is needed to prevent local communities from disconnecting with NGOs labelled as being anti-government due to ‘fear’ of be associated with these NGOs.

Therefore, addressing the primary level focus of the public health model facilitates interventions towards the whole society, with specific efforts to reduce collective grievances in the region. For, the focus of interventions is to mitigate the root causes of extremist behavior by addressing social grievances of populations sympathetic to violent extremism via addressing

---

<sup>26</sup> Interview, women leader, January 14, 2017.

macro-level issues such as poverty, marginalization, governance and improving citizen-state relationships.

### Interventions at the secondary level

Secondary prevention addresses individuals and groups identified as at-risk for violent extremism. Interventions at this level include community engagement and counter-messaging. Here, the focus of the interventions includes the prevention of the radicalization progression and minimization of potential for future radicalization (Challgren et. al. 2016). This entails disrupting an existing milieu favourable for radicalization by addressing enabling factors such as peer influence in radicalization and recruitment of youth, the need for group bonding, group socialization processes, and group solidarity. Counter measures include addressing the ideology of the extremist group, closing channels in which ideologies are promoted, or removing the promoter of the ideology or the recruiter (UNDP, 2017). Disrupting these networks became a key in CT or CVE approaches. In coastal Kenya, most interventions targeted at the meso-level focus predominantly on countering radical ideologies.<sup>27</sup> Initiatives such as the Council of Imams and Preachers of Kenya (CIPK), Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims (SUPKEM), and Building Resilience Against Violent Extremism (BRAVE) have generated critical arguments countering the religious basis for radical Islamist ideology, including replacing verses of the Quran and the hadith seen as misused.<sup>28</sup> BRAVE uses religious scriptures to engage in theological debates with radical preachers.<sup>29</sup> However, there is a need for countering secular narratives used by the Al-Shabaab and local influencers to promote these narratives.

Identification of at-risk groups and locations providing an enabling environment for radicalization are important. Programs aimed at risk communities do well by focusing on narrowly defined groups, targeted with great precision supported by a strong evidence-base

---

<sup>27</sup> Interview, CBO Personnel, June 02, 2016.

<sup>28</sup> Hadith includes the body of sayings, words, actions and habits attributed to the Prophet Muhamed.

<sup>29</sup> Interview, Religious Leader, February 28, 2016.

---

prior to program designing (USAID 2014). For example, focus should be on religious converts who are vulnerable due to the lack of proper Islamic teachings, gang members who show potential for deviant behavior, family members and friends of Al-Shabaab suspects who have close ties with radicals, and substance users and other individuals at risk due to various financial or ideological motivations.<sup>30</sup>

SUPKEM and CIPK focus on a prevention strategy based on using the role of religion to design inter-faith and intra-faith dialogues between diverse actors.<sup>31</sup> Designing of counter narratives specific to young people and their present lives offers greater potential for results than more general approaches. The deconstruction of a Quranic verse's use by extremists may not suffice to convince for many vulnerable young people. The radicals have an advantage over manipulating Quranic verses as they craft it to the specific needs of the young person and use charismatic leaders in ideology propagation.<sup>32</sup> A respondent explained the need for interventions to focus more predominantly on ideology, with an emphasis on group-level interventions. This assists in understanding how young people understand the ideology as well as the networks using these ideologies to build relationships.<sup>33</sup> Effective counter-messages are dependent on appealing messages which are designed by youth as they know the needs of their cohort best and are thus able to craft appropriate ideological messages.<sup>34</sup> Effective dissemination of information and counter-radicalization messages to the wider public is otherwise a function of the credibility of the source and impartial religious leaders. This requires authentic leaders who represent the religious traditions of the coastal Muslim community<sup>35</sup> to mitigate Al-Shabaab radicalization. Partnering with other non-Muslim communities to discuss

---

<sup>30</sup> For example, the STRIVE project has a mentorship project which works with marginalized youth by identifying and responding to their needs and working together in a process of dialogue, making them resilient to extremist narratives and incentives<sup>30</sup>.

<sup>31</sup> Interview, CBO Personnel, August 23, 2016.

<sup>32</sup> Field Notes, June 12, 2016; Interview, NGO Personnel, November 15, 2016.

<sup>33</sup> Interview, CBO Personnel, April 14, 2017.

<sup>34</sup> Interview, women leader, April 22, 2017.

<sup>35</sup> Field Notes, September 22, 2016.



---

particularly contested concepts of violence with regard to religion is also a necessity, as religious extremism affects all communities in the coast and other communities in Kenya.<sup>36</sup>

Public awareness aimed at discouraging individuals to disengage or not join extremist groups have been the core of many awareness programs conducted by non-governmental organizations such as the Kenya Community Support Centre, Muslim for Human Rights (MUHURI) and HAKI Africa<sup>37</sup> These organizations have played an influential role in bringing national institutions, local government, religious entities and community representatives together to launch public awareness campaign directed at vulnerable communities and at risk youth.<sup>38</sup> There is a need for similar programs reaching out to schools and universities in the coast considered to be hotspots for recruitment.<sup>39</sup> Public awareness programs should also incorporate stories of survivors of terrorist acts or the recruited youth and people who had been directly affected, as this has proved effective among some community awareness programs.<sup>40</sup>

The Coast Interfaith Council of Clerics (CICC) in Mombasa, conducts inter-faith dialogues between youth, religious leaders and government officials to promote relationship building using faith as a driver for CVE. The Council of Imams and Preachers of Kenya (CIPK) and the Interfaith Dialogues by the Coast Interfaith Council of Clerics (CICC) engage moderate religious leaders to reach and build capacity of youth to detect early signs of radicalization. They also train mosque monitors to systematically assess the quality and content of sermons and to observe mosque attendance. The focus of this initiative is to strengthen preaching skills with a focus on issues important for youth, and to better understand the processes of individual radicalization while safeguarding the reputation of mosques. This initiative also focused on increasing mosque attendance immediately after the mosque closures in 2014,<sup>41</sup> removing

---

<sup>36</sup> Interview, NGO Personnel, April 16, 2017.

<sup>37</sup> Interview, Community Leader, January 02, 2017. HAKI meaning rights in Swahili. The organization works on advocating principles for Humanity Activism Knowledge Integrity.

<sup>38</sup> Interview, Community Mobilizer, March 07, 2017.

<sup>39</sup> Interview, Community Mobilizer, May 07, 2016.

<sup>40</sup> Interview, Religious Leader, May 12, 2016.

<sup>41</sup> Attack at the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, resulted in a stringent of hard approaches by the security sector, one being the high surveillance on Mosques suspected for radicalization and recruitment, resulting in the closure of some mosques.

---

negative connotations associated with mosques, and facilitating an avenue for at-risk-young people who are undecided or attracted to radical ideologies to attend moderate mosques instead of radical ones.<sup>42</sup> This initiative was accompanied by strengthening the resilience of religious institutions by improving the administration of mosques, their leadership, and madrassa curriculum development.<sup>43</sup> It is important that a mosque's administration is constantly monitored by the community who nominate committee members in order to avoid the loss of credibility that would result from government appointed administrators.<sup>44</sup>

Early warning systems have supported the law enforcement officials with pertinent information from the community on particular radical activities, suspected individuals or extremist preaching.<sup>45</sup> The Nyumba Kumi initiative based on a ten-household security clusters has earned praise for gathering information on risk factors of radicalization and reporting either to the local police stations or the initiative's chief administrator at the village level. This system has, however, generated problems in Kwale County where extremists have reportedly assassinated Nyumba Kumi personnel after reporting of extremists and their activities to the law enforcement officials.<sup>46</sup> Another NGO early warning system developed by the Kenya Community Support Centre (KECOSCE) gathers information at the community level from key individuals and groups of individuals for identifying violent activities and early signs of radicalization of individuals.<sup>47</sup>

Gender-specific engagements to counter violent extremism are now necessary in light of the new roles adopted by women Al-Shabaab recruits, especially in the coast region (Daily Nation, 2016; Badurdeen 2017). The role of women as mothers, partners and friends are increasingly valued by extremist groups as direct and indirect sources of support for their operations. In her chapter, *Roles, Motivations, and Recruitment Pathways of Kenyan Women*

---

<sup>42</sup> Interview, Community Mobilizer, June 15, 2017.

<sup>43</sup> Interview, Academic, January 21, 2017.

<sup>44</sup> Interview, Community Leader, January 12, 2017.

<sup>45</sup> Interview, Law Enforcement Official, March 03, 2017.

<sup>46</sup> Interview, Community Leader, May 12, 2016.

<sup>47</sup> Interview, NGO Personnel, January 05, 2017.

---

*Recruited into the Al-Shabaab*, Badurdeen (2018) highlights the different roles women play in Al-Shabaab's Kenyan logistic operations, recruitment, and even combat. Women are vulnerable to deceptive strategies of recruitment that can involve being drugged, raped, and physically or socially coerced to join extremist groups. The importance of gender issues should be reflected in all CVE activities. Inclusion of women in the design and implementation of the programs is currently an unmet need in coastal CVE programs. The government and other stakeholders need to increase the involvement of women in CVE-related activities while recognizing their prominent role in families as wives, mothers, sisters, daughters and girlfriends.<sup>48</sup>

Programs can involve women in different roles such as identifying early signs of radicalization, community policing, and peer-to-peer training that supports women at risk of recruitment or suffering from the impacts of violent extremism.<sup>49</sup> Programs also need to provide psychological and social support for families of victims affected by violent extremism. This includes curative measures where the spouses and children, other family members, and friends who have joined violent extremist groups are provided assistance such as mentoring, counselling, and peer-to-peer support. Community support groups for rehabilitated women involved in violent extremist activities such as women returnees from Somalia, or Al-Shabaab defectors have provided a positive space for discussions and support towards rehabilitation, recovery and integration into their communities.<sup>50</sup> These support groups contribute to capacity-building, guidance on the importance of CVE interventions, life skills, and other benefits such as microfinance training, livelihood options, and entrepreneurial skills that assist those affected to change their lives instead of sinking into a state of poverty and stigmatization.<sup>51</sup>

The role of the media is vital in building bridges between and within different communities, in reducing the appeal for violent extremist ideologies, and facilitating constructive discussions mitigating youth radicalization and recruitment. For example, Radio

---

<sup>48</sup> Interview, Women Leader, March 14, 2017.

<sup>49</sup> Interview, Community Mobilizer, June 11, 2017.

<sup>50</sup> Interview, NGO Personnel, November 15, 2016.

<sup>51</sup> Interview, NGO Personnel, January 22, 2017.

---

Salaam, a Mombasa-based radio station, is engaged in producing radio features and discussions on radicalization and recruitment. Critical discussions and debate on relevant topics related to violent extremism stimulate thinking and influence related decisions while amplifying the voice of Muslims leaders committed to raising awareness and reducing radicalization and recruitment.<sup>52</sup> Social media platforms directly support the growing trend of online radicalization and recruitment for the Al-Shabaab. These sites channel young people vulnerable to extremist websites and forums to online radical forums and networks (Badurdeen, 2018). Surveillance measures by law enforcement face challenges in keeping up with different forms of technology such as new encrypted forums and platforms used by extremists.<sup>53</sup> Monitoring online platforms and websites for extremist content is an ongoing necessity for countering online radicalization and recruitment.<sup>54</sup> This highlights the need for community leaders and law enforcement officials to be equipped with the knowledge and technical skills needed to employ technology in their CVE activities.<sup>55</sup>

There should be greater investment at the school and community levels to encourage safe use of the Internet through skill training programs and initiatives to encourage parents to be aware what their children are browsing.<sup>56</sup> Online literacy programs developed for schools and universities can help promote critical thinking among the youth and students equipping them with the skills to challenge and counter ideas promoted online by extremists.<sup>57</sup> These measures, however, should not be misused for government surveillance of opposition movements or public dissent.<sup>58</sup>

---

<sup>52</sup> Interview, Religious Leader, September 23, 2016.

<sup>53</sup> Interview, Law Enforcement Official, June 21, 2017.

<sup>54</sup> Interview, Law enforcement Official, September 23, 2016.

<sup>55</sup> Interview, Law Enforcement Personnel, June 12, 2016.

<sup>56</sup> Interview, Youth Leader, May 02, 2016.

<sup>57</sup> Field Notes, January 02, 2017.

<sup>58</sup> Interview, NGO Personnel, May 22, 2017.

---

### Interventions at the tertiary level

Tertiary level interventions in CVE focus on approaches aimed at radicalized individuals and groups who may be actively planning, recruiting for, and abetting a violent extremist act or cause. Some individuals at this stage of radicalization may require counterterrorism approaches instead of CVE methods (Challgren et al. 2016). At the tertiary level interventions typically combine the role of law enforcement with intelligence from the community and security personnel. Tertiary CVE interventions include methods such as de-radicalization, disengagement, and rehabilitation. These kind of interventions necessitate expertise by psychologists, religious authorities, de-radicalized former extremists, and skilled community professionals. Interventions focus on preventing threats of impending violence and the individual's or the group's ability to carry out violence in the future.

Research on radicalization processes among youth in Kenya has documented the multiple drivers involved and how these differ from one person to another.<sup>59</sup> If an individual's drivers are, for example, unemployment, poverty, revenge against the state, and persuasion by radical recruiters, interventions may combine career guidance, scholarships, vocational training, credit schemes, and countering ideologies.<sup>60</sup> There are no one-size-fits-all prescriptions.

Discriminatory policies towards Muslims and negative stereotypes affect youth on a personal level. These factors can make young Muslims feel they do not belong and cannot integrate into their society. Recognition by peers was highlighted by informants as a critical need for young men aspiring to be respected within their communities.<sup>61</sup> Extremist organizations fill the need for recognition by giving them roles and positions within the organization accompanied by a feeling of belonging.<sup>62</sup> Interventions targeting individuals need

---

<sup>59</sup> Field notes, November 06

<sup>60</sup> Interview, Academic, May 12, 2016.

<sup>61</sup> Interview, Community Mobilizer, May 16, 2017.

<sup>62</sup> Interview, NGO Personnel, November 12, 2016.

to be tailored to address the specific unmet needs of young people vulnerable to radicalization. Failure to address these unmet needs provides a conducive environment for extremist organizations such as the Al-Shabaab stepping in to satisfy these unmet needs.<sup>63</sup> At the individual level, interventions need to focus in transforming individual behaviors and the attitudes of the radicalized, vulnerable youth, and Al-Shabaab sympathizers.<sup>64</sup> Similar interventions need to focus on attitudinal changes of young people and their families who are stigmatized by association. Other methods are required for rehabilitating youth who work as radical entrepreneurs for the Al-Shabaab or are active agents of violent extremism in the coastal region.

The delicate and complex nature of the process of disengagement of returnees or defectors requires a multifaceted approach of careful planning.<sup>65</sup> Disengagement is complicated by the context of fear and suspicion. Those who disengage fear being prosecuted by law enforcement, the possibility of execution by Al-Shabaab, and rejection by the community—all of which make them afraid of leaving the extremist group.<sup>66</sup> The state has been active in the disengagement and reintegration process of former Al-Shabaab recruits, who are often referred to as “returnees,” although some refer to them as defectors, under the Government Amnesty Program.<sup>67</sup>

There are three reasons why the role of reintegrated ex-Al-Shabaab members can be vital in CVE efforts: first, their stories provide insights into and in-depth understanding of the radicalization-recruitment process in addition to the dynamics of Al-Shabaab’s internal organization. Second, they can be proactive actors in providing intelligence on the tactics and

---

<sup>63</sup> Interview, Women Leader, September 23, 2016.

<sup>64</sup> At risk youth include youth who may have family members or relatives in extremist groups, or is involved in illegal activities such as substance abuse or gang activities or young people or are from particular locations identified as hotspots for Al-Shabaab radicalization.

<sup>65</sup> Like in many other countries, Kenya has no clear DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration) and CVE linkage in policy and practice. However, there is a need to cross-fertilize CVE and DDR specifically with regard to the reintegration process of returnees or defectors as the process overlaps geospatially. This will prevent recidivism (Piedmont, 2015)

<sup>66</sup> Interview, Community Leader, May 06, 2017.

<sup>67</sup> Immediately after the Garissa University attack which killed 148 people, the Kenyan government launched its amnesty programme offering amnesty and appropriate reintegration to youth who had joined the Al-Shabaab.

---

strategies used by Al-Shabaab. Third, they are useful contributors to the development of interventions designed for the disengagement and demobilization process of other youth.<sup>68</sup> There have been efforts by community based organizations to use disengaged youth or returnees in their work as mentors or community mobilizers. However, these efforts have been at a minimum due to the difficulties encountered in trusting ex-Al-Shabaab members and the unclear nature of legislations in working with Al-Shabaab returnees or members. Their participation is dependent on the provision of security and an enabling environment giving them hope for a new future. Caution needs to be exercised with ex-Al Shabaab members who may come *via* the government's amnesty program as they may be viewed as spies or sleepers, or may be suspected to be involved in gathering information on the whereabouts of other returnees. This can endanger the life of other returnees as was the case of individuals in Kwale who have been threatened or killed after their return. There is a need for close scrutiny of the ex-militants and must be made part of the program, especially if they have gone through adequate rehabilitation and reintegration.

The stigma and fear involved in working with ex-combatants explain why many donors and CSOs do not work with them as part of their mandates.<sup>69</sup> Rehabilitation programs should be tailored to work on an individual basis. There is a need for proper psycho-social support for individuals with suitable mentors and livelihood and employment initiatives addressing their future goals.<sup>70</sup> Constant counseling and countering extremist ideologies by credible leaders can reduce extremist tendencies among radical prisoners. Similarly, systematic rehabilitation programs for reforming ex-Al Shabaab members will assist these members to contribute positively in the community.

Therefore, tertiary level interventions in CVE aimed at micro-level, focuses on radicalized individuals and groups who may be actively planning, recruiting for, and abetting a violent extremist act or cause. Interventions such as de-radicalization, disengagement, and

---

<sup>68</sup> Interview, Community Mobilizer, March 22, 2017.

<sup>69</sup> Field notes, November 14, 2016.

<sup>70</sup> Interview, NGO Personnel, March 06, 2017.

rehabilitation and often concentrates in the radicalized individual and his or her family members and on threats of impending violence and the individual's or the group's ability to carry out violence in the future. However, most interventions at this stage is expensive and time consuming and requires expertise by psychologists, religious authorities, de-radicalized former extremists, and skilled community professionals.

### **Conclusion: Pathways for enhancing CVE interventions on the Coast of Kenya**

Collaboration involving the national government, county governments, and international organizations can facilitate incorporation of best practices for rehabilitation and the corresponding lessons learned by stakeholders contributing to Kenya's CVE efforts.<sup>71</sup> The Public Health model for CVE that provided the framework for this overview emphasizes a pre-emptive engagement to violent extremism by evaluating, addressing, and mitigating the wide-ranging dynamics of violent extremism. The article mapped the primary, secondary and tertiary CVE interventions in the coastal region of Kenya. The study revealed the need for a well-designed version of public health model to define, guide, and implement CVE. The model should focus on a well-planned system incorporating both government and non-government actors as well as defining who and at which phase of the radicalization process should be involved in mitigation efforts. The design of the system should take into consideration pre-existing prevention efforts. Organizations active in the field of CVE can utilize the model to determine where they could fit within the CVE spectrum in order to reduce duplication efforts and to achieve maximum efficiency.

Most interventions reveal the *ad hoc* nature of previous interventions that in turn highlights the need for a better CVE leadership. The National CVE strategy under the National Counter Terrorism Centre is commendable, but more effort is needed in communicating the strategy to the civil society organizations engaged in CVE.

---

<sup>71</sup> Field Notes, January 12, 2017.



---

Practitioners and policy makers working on CVE recognize the need for stronger evidence-based interventions in improving the design and effective implementation of CVE policies and programs. The need for evidence led interventions and information sharing underscores the need for primary data illuminating the localized contexts of radicalization and extremism. Such information and knowledge are crucial for designing interventions that counter these processes (Zeiger and Aly, 2015). However, the challenges in gathering information has been linked to the difficulties in measuring attitudes of de-radicalized individuals as attitudinal change is often long-term, and the required capacity needed for evaluations by implementing organizations. Although some research on CVE in the coastal region of Kenya exists, it has yet to translate into enhanced organizational interventions.<sup>72</sup>

Some of the constraints limiting the use of empirical findings begin with the variation in local contexts influencing the definition of CVE. Contested preferences regarding how we define CVE shape individual interventions. Most often these definitions mirror donor preferences and the biases of implementing organizations.<sup>73</sup> Targeted CVE interventions like countering extremist narratives may require specific contextual definitions appropriate to the religious sentiments generating emotions and animosity among communities. As stated by one respondent, CVE is often tied to Islamic extremism in a manner that results in the programs stereotyping and stigmatization a particular Muslim community.<sup>74</sup>

Most interventions in coastal Kenya are based on perceptions of the recruitment into the Al-Shabaab rather than case studies that emphasize the experience of individuals who travelled the violent extremist path.<sup>75</sup> In the article *'Reality Versus Perception: Toward Understanding Boko Haram in Nigeria'*, the authors highlighted the need to evaluate the perceptions of CVE practitioners against the testimony of at risk youth and former recruits to violent extremist organizations (Botha and Abdille, 2017). Research in such areas is constrained by the time

---

<sup>72</sup> Interview with NGO member, May 16, 2017.

<sup>73</sup> Field notes, February 11, 2017.

<sup>74</sup> Interview, NGO Personnel, January 02, 2017.

<sup>75</sup> Interview, NGO Personnel, November 22, 2016.

---

required for in-depth field work, funding, difficulty of access, and the shortage of experienced researchers with expertise in working with hard to reach populations. Triangulating data from multiple sources is necessary as a consequence, which requires collaboration between law enforcement personnel and communities.<sup>76</sup> Implications of the lack of in-depth data on a phenomenon like recruitment pathways compromise the inability to forecast trends in recruitment and may contribute to superficial mitigation projects that consume limited resources. Campaigns designed to counter violent extremism online often proceed without appropriate research into the phenomenon of online violent extremism.<sup>77</sup> More empirical research is needed on how social media affects the behavior of individuals before making assumptions on how the process of online radicalization can be prevented (Zeiger and Aly 2015).

Evidence-based interventions need platforms for research and information sharing. There is currently little academic research on violent extremism and the findings from research institutes and think-tanks. This accounts for the programs that do not cater for implementable strategies that address the issues of a particular region.<sup>78</sup> There is a need for more CVE research dissemination, the sharing of best practices and research methodologies, and lessons learned. Some examples of regional initiatives bridging academics, policy makers and practitioners include the BRICS (Building Resilience in Civil Society in Kenya), The Rift Valley Institute forums on CVE, and the policy studies by Centre for Human Rights and Policy Studies (CHRIPS). There is a need to invest in more research on recruitment via the social media platforms, crime and the terrorism nexus, young people and their resilience towards violent extremism, terrorism and the human trafficking connection, gaps in the existing de-radicalization process of former combatants under the government amnesty offer, and the strategies of radical preachers. Also, researching violent radicalization group dynamics and

---

<sup>76</sup> Interview, Academic, June 12, 2017.

<sup>77</sup> Interview, NGO Personnel, January 02, 2017.

<sup>78</sup> Field Notes, November 06, 2016.

---

networking processes will benefit from knowledge from various other fields of study such as cult or gang research, social media analysis, drug networks, and social movements.

Academic partnerships with law enforcement organizations can enhance interventions disrupting different recruitment pathways.<sup>79</sup> These partnerships could operationalize studies related to the offline and online channels of communication with the aim of reducing online radicalization and recruitment.<sup>80</sup> These interventions aimed at intercepting ‘or spying’ should not be turned into a mass surveillance targeting communities or state attempts to curb voices of political dissent (Badurdeen, 2018)

Interventions specific to local communities should take into account contextual differences like the local factors conditioning embedded webs of community relationships.<sup>81</sup> Solutions need to be localized where the communities own the process and local CSOs play a vital role by utilizing their local expertise. In these cases, caution is necessary to avoid a small group of local elite CSOs taking control of the CVE interventions, and the CVE funding must be managed to promote diversity among CSOs working in the field.

Very few community organizations are involved or have capacity to be involved at the project conception stages, which are often controlled by donors influenced by their domestic CVE models.<sup>82</sup> Also, organizations working on CVE tend to lose focus on domestic violent extremist trends and patterns when they have to respond to extraneous factors featuring in donor proposals. There is a need to encourage bottom up projects driven by empirical research. One example is the case of radicalization or recruitment linked to human smuggling or trafficking networks or recruitment of youth through educational institutions. Community attitudes should be assessed before launching projects such as sensitization, awareness campaigns, disseminating particular tools of CVE, or using technical terminology that may alienate local communities. Likewise, community attitudes should be assessed before designing reintegration

---

<sup>79</sup> Interviewee, Law Enforcement Official, January 02, 2017.

<sup>80</sup> Field Notes, June 12, 2016.

<sup>81</sup> Interview, CBO member, May 22, 2017.

<sup>82</sup> Field notes, January 02, 2017.

programs for returnees or Al-Shabaab defectors where community support is vital for effective reintegration.<sup>83</sup> A policy approach for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) requires an instrumental shift addressing the DDR-CVE intersection designating that DDR be viewed as a conflict prevention measure rather than a post-conflict peace building effort. This will address the phenomenon of recidivism among members of armed groups.

Monitoring and evaluation frameworks should avoid one-size-fits all solutions for different CVE interventions. There is a corresponding need for capacity building programs for local institutions to develop institutional monitoring and evaluation with a view towards sharing good practices.<sup>84</sup>

With the emergence of decentralized CVE plans at the county levels in Kenya, it is expected that different CVE approaches will be integrated to minimize duplication of projects.<sup>85</sup> The county CVE plans will ideally include a macro-level approach to measure the overall impact of different projects on the community as well as to learn from failures. This would also facilitate understanding the secondary and tertiary effects of different CVE interventions across different locations.

The article has highlighted the prevailing gaps in CVE programming and practice. A broader analysis including evaluations of particular projects could shed more light on the impact of the projects. More reflections on the impact of CVE initiatives at the individual and community level is vital for the sustainability of projects that can be replicated in similar regions suffering the violent effects of youth radicalization and recruitment for terrorist networks.

---

<sup>83</sup> Interview, NGO member, May 16, 2017.

<sup>84</sup> Field notes, December 28, 2016.

<sup>85</sup> Interview, Academic, September 16, 2016.

## References

- Ayiera, E. A. (2015). *Local Policing Accountability in Kenya: Challenges and Opportunities for Action*. Nairobi: Centre for Human Rights and Policy Studies.
- Badurdeen, F.A. (2012). Youth Radicalization in the Coast Province of Kenya, *Africa Peace and Conflict Journal*, 5(1): 53-64.
- Badurdeen, F. A. (2016). Al-Shabaab Terrorist Recruitment in Kenya: Contributions from the Social Movement Theory". Paper presented at the 24th International Congress of Political Science, Social Movement Approaches Panel, Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznan, Poland, 23-28 July, 2016.
- Badurdeen, F. A. and Ndenyele, W. O. (2014). Public participation in development projects: case study of the new port of Lamu in Kenya. *Kenya Studies Review*, 6(1): 232-249.
- Badurdeen, F. A. (2017). An evaluation of the Anti-Terrorism Laws in Kenya. Paper presented at the Fifth Annual Conference on Law and Religion in Africa, African Consortium for Law and Religion Studies (ACLARS), International University of Rabat, Morocco 14-16 May 2017.
- Badurdeen, F. A. (2018). Roles, Motivations, and Recruitment Pathways of Kenyan Women Recruited into the Al-Shabaab, in Mazrui, A., Njogu, K., and Goldsmith, P. (Eds.). *Countering Violent Extremism in Kenya: Between the Rule of Law and the Quest for Security*. Nairobi: Twaweza Communications, 151-168.
- Badurdeen, F. A. (2018). Online Recruitment and Radicalization: Al-Shabaab luring strategies with new technology, in Ruteere, M. and Mutahi, P. (Eds). *Confronting Violent Extremism in Kenya: Debates, Ideas and Challenges*. Nairobi: Centre for Human Rights and Policy Studies.
- Beyer, A. C. (2008). *Violent Globalism: Conflict in Response to Empire*. Aldershot, Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing.
- Bosire, C. M. (2013). Devolution for Development, Conflict resolution and Limiting Central Power: An analysis of the Constitution of Kenya 2010. Thesis. Cape Town: Faculty of Law, University of Western Cape.
- Botha, A. (2013). *Assessing the vulnerability of Kenyan youths to radicalisation and extremism*. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies.

Botha, A. and Abdile, M. (2017). Reality versus Perception: Toward Understanding Boko Haram in Nigeria. *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*,

Brett, J. and Kahlmeyer, A. (2017). Strengthening Resilience to Violent Extremism – Strive Horn of Africa: Evaluation Report. Retrieved from:  
<https://170124-STRIVE-evaluation-Report-Final.pdf>

Cannon, B. J. and Pakalya, D. R. (2017). Why al-Shabaab Attacks Kenya: Questioning the Narrative Paradigm. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 1-13.

Centre for Human Rights and Policy Studies (2016). Preventing Violent Extremism in Kenya: Policy Options. Nairobi: CHRIPS.  
<https://UNDP-JourneyToExtremism-report-2017-english.pdf>

Challgren, J., Kenyon, T., Kervick, L., Scudder, S., Walters, M. and Whitehead, K., Connor, J., and Flynn, C. R. (2016). Countering Violent Extremism: Applying the Public Health Model. Washington DC: Georgetown Security Studies Review.

Chertoff, M. (2015). Notes from the White House Summit on Countering Violent Extremism. The Hill, 26 February 2015:  
<http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/homeland-security/233831-notes-from-the-white-house-summit-on-countering-violent>

Daily Nation (2016). The Rise of Women in Terrorism, September 17, 2016. Retrieved from:  
<https://www.nation.co.ke/lifestyle/lifestyle/The-rise-of-women-in-terrorism/1214-3384688-b7c19f/index.html>

Davis, J. (2010). *Terrorism in Africa: The Evolving front in the War on Terror*. Plymouth: Lexington Books.

Demant, F., Slooman, M., Buijs, F. and Tilly, J. (2008). Decline and Disengagement: An analysis of Processes of Deradicalization. Amsterdam: Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies at the University of Amsterdam.

Dunstan, S. (2011). *Entebbe: The Most Daring Raid of Israel's Special Forces*. New York: Rosen Publishing.

Hansen, S. J. (2013). *Al Shabaab in Somalia: The History and Ideology of a Militant Islamist Group, 2005-2012*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Howell, J. and Lind, J. (2009). *Counter-Terrorism, Aid and Civil Society: Before and after the war on terror*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

HM Government (2006). *Countering International Terrorism: The United Kingdom's Strategy – July 2006*.

[https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/272320/6888.pdf](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/272320/6888.pdf)

International Crisis Group. (2014). *Kenya: Al Shabaab – closer to Home Africa Briefing No. 102*. Brussels: International Crisis Group. Retrieved online:

[http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/files/africa/horn-of-africa/kenya/b102-kenya-al-shabaab-closer-to-home.pdf](http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/files/africa/horn-of-africa/kenya/b102-kenya-al-shabaab-closer-to-home.pdf)

IRIN (2016). *How Kenya's Al-Shabaab Amnesty is a loaded gun*, August 31, 2016. Retrieved from:

<https://www.irinnews.org/investigations/2016/08/31/how-kenya%E2%80%99s-al-shabab-amnesty-loaded-gun>

Kenya Human Rights Commission. (2016). *Towards a Protected and expanded civic space in Kenya and beyond*. Nairobi: Kenya Human Rights Commission.

Kessels, E. and Nemr, C. (2016). *Countering Violent Extremism and Development Assistance: Identifying Synergies, Obstacles and Opportunities*. London: Global Center on Cooperative Security.

Maszka, J. (2018). *Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram: Guerilla Insurgency or Strategic Terrorism?* New Jersey: World Scientific Publishing Europe Ltd.

Mogire, E. and Agade, K. M. (2011). *Counter terrorism in Kenya*. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 29(4): 473-491.

Nyanjom, O. (2011). *Devolution in Kenya's New Constitution*. Nairobi: Society for International Development.

Nyheim, D. (2015). *Early Warning and Response to Violent Conflict: Time for a Rethink*. London: Saferworld.

Ogada, M. (2017). *Emerging Developments in Countering Violent Extremism and Counter terrorism in Kenya*. Nairobi: Centre for Human Rights and Policy Studies.

OSCE. “Preventing Terrorism and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism: A Community-Policing Approach.” OSCE, February, 2014. <http://www.osce.org/atu/111438?download=true>.

Piedmont, D. (2015). *The Role of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) in Countering Violent Extremism*. Zurich: Center for Security Studies.

Prestholdt, J. (2011). *Kenya, the United States, and Counter Terrorism*. *Africa Today*, 57(4): 2-27.

Ramraj, V. V., Hor, M., Roach, K. and Williams, G. (2012). *Global Anti-Terrorism Law and Policy* (2<sup>nd</sup> Ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ridley, N. (2014). *Terrorism in East and West Africa: The Under-focused Dimension*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited.

Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) (2017). *STRIVE: Lessons Learned*. Nairobi: Royal United Services Institute.

Ruteere, M. and Mutahi, P. (2018). Civil Society Pathways to Peace and Security: The Peace and Security for Development Programme in Coastal Kenya, in Mazrui, A., Njogi, K., and Goldsmith, P. (Eds.). *Countering Violent Extremism in Kenya: Between the Rule of Law and the Quest for Security*. Nairobi: Twaweza Communications, 169-182.

Sodipo, M.O. (2013). *Mitigating Radicalism in Northern Nigeria*, African Security Brief, No.26.

Subedi, D.B. (2017). Early Warning and Response for Preventing Radicalization and Violent Extremism. *Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice*, 29(2): 135-143.

The National Academies of Science, Engineering and Medicine (2017). *Countering Violent Extremism through Public Health Practice*. Washington DC: The National Academic Press.

The Star (2015). Al Shabaab still a major security threat to Kenya – returnees, November 18, 2015. Retrieved from: [https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2015/11/18/al-shabaab-still-a-major-security-threat-to-kenya-returnees\\_c1241219](https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2015/11/18/al-shabaab-still-a-major-security-threat-to-kenya-returnees_c1241219)

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (2017). *Journey to Extremism in Africa: Drivers, Incentives and the tipping point for recruitment*. New York: UNDP.



United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (2016). Preventing and Responding to Violent Extremism in Africa: A Development Approach. Retrieved from:

[https://UNDP\\_RBA\\_Preventing\\_and\\_Responding\\_to\\_Violent\\_Extremism\\_2016-19\\_2.pdf](https://UNDP_RBA_Preventing_and_Responding_to_Violent_Extremism_2016-19_2.pdf)

USAID. (2011). *The Development Response to Violent Extremism and Insurgency: Putting Principles into Practice*. Washington, DC: USAID.

United Nations Report. (2012). *Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council resolution*. Retrieved from

[http://www.somaliareport.com/downloads/UN\\_REPORT\\_2012.pdf](http://www.somaliareport.com/downloads/UN_REPORT_2012.pdf) (Accessed on May 2, 2016)

Vadlamudi, S. (2007). The U.S. Embassy Bombings in Kenya and Tanzania in Forest, J. *Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Security International, 103-127.

Zieger, S. and Aly, A. (2015). *Countering Violent Extremism: Developing an evidence base for policy and practice*. Perth, Australia: Curtin University.

### About the JD Journal for Deradicalization

The JD Journal for Deradicalization is the world's only peer reviewed periodical for the theory and practice of deradicalization with a wide international audience. Named an "[essential journal of our times](#)" (Cheryl LaGuardia, Harvard University) the JD's editorial board of expert advisors includes some of the most renowned scholars in the field of deradicalization studies, such as Prof. Dr. John G. Horgan (Georgia State University); Prof. Dr. Tore Bjørgo (Norwegian Police University College); Prof. Dr. Mark Dechesne (Leiden University); Prof. Dr. Cynthia Miller-Idriss (American University Washington); Prof. Dr. Julie Chernov Hwang (Goucher College); Prof. Dr. Marco Lombardi, (Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore Milano); Dr. Paul Jackson (University of Northampton); Professor Michael Freeden, (University of Nottingham); Professor Hamed El-Sa'id (Manchester Metropolitan University); Prof. Sadeq Rahimi (University of Saskatchewan, Harvard Medical School), Dr. Omar Ashour (University of Exeter), Prof. Neil Ferguson (Liverpool Hope University), Prof. Sarah Marsden (Lancaster University), Dr. Kurt Braddock (Pennsylvania State University), Dr. Michael J. Williams (Georgia State University), and Aaron Y. Zelin (Washington Institute for Near East Policy).

For more information please see: [www.journal-derad.com](http://www.journal-derad.com)

Twitter: @JD\_JournalDerad

Facebook: [www.facebook.com/deradicalisation](http://www.facebook.com/deradicalisation)

The JD Journal for Deradicalization is a proud member of the Directory of Open Access Journals (DOAJ).

ISSN: 2363-9849

Editors in Chief: Daniel Koehler